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Questions of law are generally given full de novo review on appeal.1
Most federal courts of appeals depart from this standard, however, when
reviewing questions of unclear state law. They afford district court deci-
sions on unclear questions some degree of deference, primarily on the
ground that the district judge has special expertise with state law.
2
The Tenth Circuit generally applies an extremely deferential stan-
dard when reviewing questions of unclear state law. It is the only circuit
that reviews these questions under a clearly wrong or dearly erroneous
standard.3 This unusual practice is embodied in the court's "local judge
rule." 4 This article examines the local judge rule, its implications for
appellate practioners, its theoretical underpinnings and concludes that
the court should abandon its highly deferential standard in favor of full
de novo review.
Pinning the Tenth Circuit down, however, is difficult. While it is
accurate to say that the court has generally reviewed questions of un-
clear state law under the dearly erroneous or dearly wrong standard,
there is a great deal of confusion in the case law. Of course, the confu-
sion would not matter much if the local judge rule were unimportant.
* LL.M., Yale Law School, 1990;J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law, 1986;
B.A., Greenville College, 1983. The author clerked for ChiefJudge WilliamJ. Holloway,
Jr., in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (1988-1989), and for the
Honorable William C. Lee in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana (1986-1988). The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
Many thanks to Akhil Reed Amar, Maury Cuje, Laura Gaudian, Shelly Goodnight,
Joshua Newberg, Mark Spencer, Richard Sullivan and Laura Underkuffler for helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts.
1. Not only are questions of federal law reviewed under the de novo standard, see
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984)("FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) does not
inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law"), but the same is true for ques-
tions of foreign law. A trial court's determination of foreign law is viewed as "a ruling on a
question of law" and is subject to de novo review. See FED. R. APP. P. 44.1.
2. For a discussion of the standard in other circuits, see infra notes 63-64 & 72-73
and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit reviews questions of unclear state law de novo.
Other circuits give some degree of deference to the district judge's conclusions.
3. For a discussion of Tenth Circuit case law, see infra notes 26-47 and accompany-
ing text. A number of themes emerge from the cases-one is confusion. The Tenth Cir-
cuit has applied numerous inconsistent standards. See infa notes 27-38 and accompanying
text. Another theme which is in some tension with the first, is that the court has generally
applied an extremely deferential standard of review, whether enunciated as a clearly wrong
or dearly erroneous standard. See infa note 26.
4. The phrase "local judge rule" is taken from various Tenth Circuit opinions. See,
e.g., Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 912 n.7 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1006 (1988); Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (10th
Cir. 1985)(McKayJ., concurring).
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But the rule has great significance. It essentially condones departure
from the normal de novo standard of review for issues of law.5 The rule
applies only to issues of unclear state law-that is, issues on which the
pertinent state supreme court has not yet ruled.6
While the Tenth Circuit has fervently applied its local judge rule, it
has failed to establish conclusively just how much deference it will give
to district court determinations of unclear state law. Instead, it has ap-
plied inconsistent standards, providing little authoritative guidance and
leaving appellate practitioners a full menu of choices. 7
Part I of this article examines the local judge rule as applied by the
federal courts of appeals. The discussion highlights the Tenth Circuit's
unique position with regard to the rule and addresses the implications
for appellate practitioners.
Part II considers the various theoretical justifications for the rule.
These include the notion that deference to the federal district court is
mandated by Erie v. Tompkins8, the expertise of the federal district court
judge in matters of state law,9 and the United States Supreme Court's
practice of deferring to determinations of state law by lower federal
courts. 10 None of these justifications withstands scrutiny. Part III sug-
gests that the Tenth Circuit thoughtfully reconsider its local judge rule
en banc and argues that issues of unclear state law should be given full
de novo review.
I. THE LOCAL JUDGE RULE IN THE CIRCUrrS
A. Some General Obseruations
Before launching into the intricacies of Tenth Circuit law some gen-
eral observations are in order. The local judge rule applies only to de-
terminations of state law. It does not apply to questions of federal law
or determinations of foreign law. 1 Even in the realm of state law, how-
ever, the rule has limited application. It applies only when state law is
unclear. 1 2 Questions of state law are considered unclear when the state
5. As the standard of review becomes less exacting, the court gives up part of its
important function as a court of appeals. Beyond reviewing for correctness, a court of
appeals provides some degree of certainty and uniformity when declaring law.
6. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra notes 75-107 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 108-145 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 146-159 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir.
1978)("[W]hen state decisional law... affords no guidance, the interpretation of the dis-
trict judge, who is well versed in the intracacies and trends of local law, is entitled to great
deference."); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir.
1973) ("The views of a district judge on the unsettled law of his state are.., ordinarily
accepted.")(citing Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619, 621 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971). But see Hauserv. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir.
1986) (applying the rule where the Colorado Supreme Court had ruled on a closely related
issue).
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supreme court has not yet ruled on an issue.13 The local judge rule
applies not only to diversity cases but it also applies to all cases where
state law supplies the rule of decision.
14
While focusing the inquiry on matters of unclear state law is impor-
tant, it is also simplistic and misleading, since one unclear question of
state law may differ radically from another. Confronting an issue of un-
clear state law might mean confronting conflicting state court deci-
sions. 15 It might mean that there are no state decisions on point at all,
or at least none which provide clear guidance. 16 It might mean that the
only relevant law to which the federal district court can look in predict-
ing how the state supreme court would rule 17 is from other jurisdic-
tions. 18 Finally, it might even mean that the only relevant decisions are
from other federal courts. To say only that an issue is unclear, there-
13. See, e.g., Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 925 (10th Cir. 1987)(Mc-
Kay, J., dissenting)("[t]he rule is written for and applies only to cases ... in which there is
no direct state supreme court precedent regarding the matter of state law in dispute, for
the rule is unnecessary when the state supreme court has already spoken."), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1006 (1988). The reason for the rule's inapplicability in the face of state supreme
court precedent is dear. When a state supreme court has ruled on an issue, the frderal
courts are generally bound to follow the high court's ruling and the task of ascertaining
state law is relatively simple. See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4507, at- 91-94 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter
WRIGHT & MILLER].
There are exceptional circumstances in which a federal court might be justified in
disregarding a state high court decision, but these circumhstances are rare. See, e.g.,
Dawkins v. White Prods. Corp., 443 F.2d 5.89 (5th Cir. 1971); Mason v. American.Emery
Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957)(federal courts may anticipate a change in state
law based on dictum from the state's highest court), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957).
14. This is a critical point. The difficulty of ascertaining unclear state law transcends
diversity jurisdiction. It also exists in federal question cases. Federal law is interstitial in
nature; it seldom if ever occupies a field in its entirety. "Congress acts, in short, against
the background of the total corpusjuris of the states in much the way that a state legislature
acts against the backdrop of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legis-
lation." See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
533-34, 861 & n.6 (3d ed. 1989)[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. See generally Hart, The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954). See also'infra note 77.
15. See, e.g., Taxpayers for Animas-La Plata v. Animas-La Plata, 739 F.2d 1472, 1476-
77 (10th Cir. 1984).
16. See, e.g., An-Son Corp. v. Holland-America Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 700, 704 (10th Cir.
1985)(applying the local judge rule in the absence of dear state precedent); Caspary v.
Louisiana Land and Explor., 707 F.2d 785, 788-89 (4th Cir. 1983)(district judge familiar
with the state law is accorded substantial deference when state law provides no clear prece-
dent); Lamb v. Briggs Mfg., 700 F.2d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 1983)("IWlhere no authorita-
tive resolution of a legal issue ha[s] been rendered by the state courts, the district court's
construction of state law entitled to great weight."); Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 686 F.2d
642, 648 (8th Cir. 1982).
17. See infa notes 96-97 and accompanying text. Erie mandates that federal courts
ascertain how the highest state court would rule on a state matter. Nolan v. Transocean
Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1961). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§§ 55-60 (4th ed. 1983)[hereinafter WRIGT]; Note, The Ascertainment of State Law in a Fed-
eral Diversity Case, 40 IND. LJ. 541, 553 (1965)[hereinafter Note, The Ascertainment of State
Law].
18. See, e.g., Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (ldth'Cir' l 987)(district
court's application of well-settled law of other jurisdictions entitled to deference); Fox v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 780-83 (10th Cir. 1978); Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1019-23 nn.4-8 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973)(the
district court noted specifically that the issue was one of first impression in South Dakota
and that there were conflicting lines of authority from outside the state).
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fore, is to say something with a variety of potential meanings. This point
is central to Part II, Section B, which considers in detail what it means to
say the district judge is an expert in matters of unclear state law.
Nevertheless, when an unclear issue of state law presents itself, the
local judge rule applies unless it is trumped by an exception.1 9 Excep-
tions have been recognized when both the district judge and a member
of the appellate panel have experience with the applicable state law,20 or
where a district court judge is sitting by designation.2 1 Courts have de-
clined to apply the rule where there are conflicting opinions from lower
federal courts. 2 2 A number of courts have also held that the rule should
not be applied if the district court inadequately analyzes state law or fails
to articulate dearly the basis for its decision. 23 Exceptions have also
been recognized where the district judge is interpreting the law of an-
other state.
24
If the local judge rule applies, the Tenth Circuit and most other
circuits will give some deference to the district court's determination of
state law. Just how much deference is given is the subject of the remain-
der of Part I. Three different standards emerge and may be broadly
categorized as: (1) extreme deference, in which case the court of ap-
peals will not reverse the district court's determination of state law un-
less it is "clearly erroneous" or "clearly wrong"; (2) intermediate
deference, in which case the court of appeals will not reverse the district
court's determination of state law unless it is convinced to the contrary;
and (3) no deference.
B. The Standard in the Tenth Circuit
One thing can be said with certainty about the Tenth Circuit's stan-
dard of review for unclear determinations of state law: whatever it is, it
19. For a brief general discussion of a number of recognized exceptions see Note, In
re McLinn: De Novo Review of District Court Interpretations of Unclear State Law, 6 BRIDGEPORT
L. REv. 271, 281 nn.51-53 (1985)[hereinafter Note, In Re McLinn].
20. See Caspary v. Louisiana Land and Explor., 707 F.2d 785, 788 n.5 (4th Cir.
1983)(where both the district judge and two members of the appellate panel have experi-
ence with applicable state law the deference accorded the district court's decisions is
neutralized).
21. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 911 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (it is inappropriate to defer to the district court's views' where
another district judge has expressed contrary views)(citing Maughn v. SW Servicing, Inc.,
758 F.2d 1381, 1384 n.2 (10th Cir. 1985)); see also Big River Grain, Inc. v. SBA, 718 F.2d
968, 970 (9th Cir. 1983)(abandoning the "clearly wrong" standard where bankruptcy
judge and district court judge disagreed on Idaho law).
23. See Weiss v. United States, 787 F.2d 518, 525 (10th Cir. 1986); Rabon v. Guard-
smark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.1 (4th Cir. 1978)(refusing to accord any weight to
district court's oral determination of unclear state law on the ground that the court had
given no citation to authority except a passing reference to a case identified at argument
by counsel and that the novel issue of great importance deserved greater treatment), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 656 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1981)(deference
accorded a district judge not given when interpreting the law of another state). But see
supra note 18 and cases cited therein.
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has been vigorously enforced. 25 Commentators have generally placed
the Tenth Circuit in the first category discussed above. 26 Closer analysis
reveals, however, what might be described as a schizophrenic, but
wholehearted, application of the local judge rule.
In 1952, the Tenth Circuit held that a district court's determination
of unclear state law would not be overturned unless "clearly errone-
ous."'2 7 Recently, the court placed itself near the other end of the spec-
trum, holding that because "an issue of state law is presented here, we
give some deference to the resident district judge's interpretation, but
ultimately review de novo whether the district judge applied the proper
legal standards."'2 8 What happened between 1952 and 1989? Just
about everything that could happen to one modest procedural rule.
During those years, the court relied on its local judge rule nearly
one hundred times with an enormous variety of expression. 29 In addi-
tion to the two extremes just mentioned, the court has accorded state
law determinations "extraordinary persuasive force,"3 0 "extraordinary
force,". 1 "great weight," 3 2 "substantial.weight,"
3 3 "great deference," 3 4
"deference," 3 5 "'some deference,"3 6 "a degree of deference,"3 7 and "at
25. See infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
26. See WxGHr & MILLER, supra note 13, at 108-10 n.60. See also lAJ. MooRE, W.
TAGGART &J. WICKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309[2], at 3125-29 & n.28 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter MooRE] (stating that "some appellate courts--and we think erroneously
so-will not interfere with the trial court's interpretation of local law unless 'clearly erro-
neous'" and citing Tenth Circuit cases).
There is undoubtedly abundant 'support for placing the Tenth Circuit in the dearly
erroneous camp, as citation to 1980 cases alone demonstrates. See, e.g., Weatherhead v.
Globe Int'l, 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1987); Hauser v. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d
876, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); Corbitt v. City of Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir.
1985); Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir. 1985)(applying FED R. Civ. P.
52(a)); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984); King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983);
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982)(applying FED. R. Cirv. P.
52(a)). For a comprehensive list of citations see Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d
908, 923-25 (McKay, J., dissenting).
27. Mitton v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 196 F.2d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 1952).
28. Midamerica Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Shearson/Am. Express, 886 F.2d 1249,
1253 (10th Cir. 1989)(citing Wilson v. McCord, Inc., 858 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir.
1988)).
29. For a partial listing of pre-1987 cases, see Judge McKay's dissent in Rawson, 822
F.2d at 923-25, where he string-cites seventy-two cases, referring to the rule as one "sanc-
tified by use and citation."
30. Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281, 287 (10th Cir. 1977); Stevens v. Barnard, 512 F.2d
876, 880 (10th Cir. 1975); Stafos V. Jarvis, 477 F.2d 369, 373 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 944 (1973).
31. Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1983).
32. Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. 1975).
33. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 567, 571 (10th Cir.
1979).
34. Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985); Mus-
tang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir. 1977).
35. Taxpayers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water Conser-
vancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984).
36. Corbit v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985); Colonial Park Country
Club v. Joan of Arc, 746 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984).
37. Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1980).
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least a modicum of deference."3 8 These are only a few expressions of
the rule.
Given the significant differences between the standards (for exam-
ple, the "clearly erroneous" standard and the "ultimately review de
novo" standard),3 9 one might reasonably expect someone on the court
to speak up. She did. In Carter v. City of Salina,40 Judge Seymour con-
curred to "indicate [her] disagreement with the majority's application of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ... " and to point out "the confusion over this issue
within [the Tenth] circuit."' 4 1 Reviewing various expressions of the stan-
dard, Judge Seymour went on to say "[a]t best we are inconsistent; at
worst, we are confused, and, in my view, this time we are just plain
wrong."
4 2
What followed is interesting. In Wilson v. Al McCord, Inc.,43 the ma-
jority boldy stated, in reviewing the district court's interpretation of an
Oklahoma statute, "[o]ur review of an interpretation of state law is de
novo." 44 In support of that new version of the local judge rule, the ma-
jority cited Judge Seymour's concurring opinion in Carter.4 5 Ironically,
Judge Seymour had specifically (and appropriately) stated in her concur-
rence in Carter, "I do not urge that we adopt a new standard without en
banc consideration .... "46 To compound the irony and dispel any be-
lief that Judge Seymour's concurrence in Carter could by itself change
the standard, post-Carter cases continued to enunciate the "clearly erro-
neous" standard along with a variety of other standards.
47
Pinning the court down to a firm position on the local judge rule is
38. Cedar v. Daniel Int'l Corp., No. 82-2574, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. April 26, 1983).
39. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
40. 773 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 256 (Seymour, J., concurring). However inappropriate the majority's cita-
tion to FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) in other respects, it is supported by Tenth Circuit case law.
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982)(applying FED. R. Civ. P. 52 to
the review of the district court's interpretation of state law); Rasmussen Drilling v. Kerr-
McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1148 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862
(1978).
42. Carter, 773 F.2d at 257.
43. 858 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1988).
44. Id. at 1477. The district court interpreted an Oklahoma statute which provided
that "no commission or other remuneration [may be] paid or given directly or indirectly
for the solicitation of any such sale excluding any commission or remuneration paid or given
by and between parties each of whom is engaged in the business of exploring for or pro-
ducing oil and gas .... Id. Agreeing with the defendant's construction of the statute, the
court held that the exclusion applied. See Wilson v. Al McCord, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 621
(W.D. Okla. 1985).
45. Wilson, 858 F.2d at 1477.
46. Carter, 773 F.2d at 256. Judge Seymour's unwillingness to urge adoption of a new
standard by the three-judge panel is perfectly appropriate. A panel is not at liberty to
ignore or reject a prior decision by another panel. Only the en banc court may reject
established circuit authority. United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1450 (1oth Cir.
1987)(en banc)(rehearing granted to "consider the propriety of changing established
rule"); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 425 (10th Cir. 1963)(en banc)(en banc court
convened "to reexamine our prevailing rule"), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964).
47. See, e.g., Hauser v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 797 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir.
1986)(citing King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983)). Judge Sey-
mour again filed a concurring opinion, this time explicitly stating, "I do not believe that
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difficult, if not impossible. Tenth Circuit law is just as confused today as
it ever was. But does the confusion matter? Are the standards really
that different? The answer is yes. In fact, when conscientiously applied,
the local judge rule may be dispositive.
Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.48 exemplifies how the standard of re-
view may affect the outcome of the case. Gary Rawson was employed by
Sears for thirty-three years and served as manager of the Pueblo, Colo-
rado store from 1965 through 1979, the date of his termination. He
argued that Colorado statutes provided him with an implied right of ac-
tion for discharge based solely on age.49 The district court agreed and
issued a number of thoughtful published opinions. 50 After separate jury
trials on liability and damages, Rawson was awarded $580,500 for lost
wages and benefits, $264,410 for future wages, $5,000,000 for pain and
suffering, and $10,000,000 in punitive damages, for a total of more than
$19,000,000.51 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
Sears' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, vacated the
judgments, and remanded for dismissal of the complaint. 52
Prior to the district court's decision, no court, state or federal, had
addressed whether the statutes provided an implied cause of action for
age discrimination. 53 The district court considered certification, but
concluded that it should decide the issue.54 After the district court's
[the dearly erroneous] standard is the appropriate one for our review of the district court's
conclusion [of state law]." Hauser, 797 F.2d at 881 (Seymour, J., concurring).
ChiefJudge Holloway, in Huffman v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., Nos. 86-2630 and 86-
2658, slip op. at n.19 (10th Cir. April 18, 1990), states correctly that "we have applied a
variety of standards in the past to describe the degree of deference to be accorded-to a
local judge's interpretation of state law . J. " judge Barrett, in what may be the most
confusing statement in the Tenth Circuit's case law on the issue states that "in our de novo
review, we have recognized different degrees of deference we must give... we shall pro-
ceed under the 'some deference' standard." Phico Ins. Co. v. Providers Ins. Co., 888 F.2d
663, 666 (10th Cir. 1989); see also American Coleman v. Intrawest Bank, 887 F.2d 1382,
1387 (1989).
48. 822 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988).
49. Rawson's suit was removed by Sears from state to federal court on diversity of
citizenship grounds. Id. at 910. Rawson argued that Colorado penal statutes provided
him with an implied cause of action for wrongful discharge. One of the statutes provided,
inter alia, that "[n]o ... corporation... shall discharge any individual between the ages of
eighteen and sixty years solely and only upon the ground of age, if such individual is well
versed in the line of business carried on by such person... or corporation." See CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 8-2-116 (1973)(repealed 1986).
50. In response to Sears' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district
court ruled that the legislature intended to create an implied cause of action under CoLo.
Rxv. STAT. § 8-2-116 (1973)(repealed 1986) and that such a right of action was consistent
with Colorado's labor relations legislation. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 530 F.
Supp. 776, 778 (D. Colo. 1982).
51. Following the trial on liability, the district court again held that private damage
awards were proper under the statute. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 585 F. Supp.
1393 (D. Colo. 1984). See also Rawson, 822 F.2d at 910.
52. Rawson, 822 F.2d at 922.
53. Id. at 911.
54. See id. at 910 & n.4. Sears requested certification in the district court. On appeal,
both parties opposed certification. This illustrates an important point. Certification is one
way federal courts can avoid questions of unclear state law. If the question is certified and
the state court decides it, the federal court will simply apply the state law. The Supreme
Court encouraged certification in Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974), when
1990]
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decision, but before the decision, on appeal, lower state and federal
courts split almost evenly on the issue.55 Acknowledging the local judge
rule, the majority recited the "some deference" standard, but went on to
note that where "another resident district [court] judge has expressed
views contrary to those expressed by the trial court in the case... 'it is
inappropriate to defer to the district court's views.' ",56 The majority
then analyzed in agonizing detail the merits of the implied right of ac-
tion, looking both to Colorado law and the law of other jurisdictions.
The Tenth Circuit ultimately disagreed with the district court and con-
cluded that Colorado's statute did not provide Rawson with a remedy.
57
There can be little doubt, as Judge McKay points out so powerfully
in his dissent, that the majority's refusal to apply the local judge rule was
dispositive.5 8 Had the "clearly erroneous" standard been applied-in-
deed, had any version of the local judge rule been applied-the district
court's judgment would have been affirmed.5 9
Rawson demonstrates the rather unremarkable proposition that the
outcome of a case may turn on the standard of review applied by the
court of appeals. Rawson is but one illustration of the importance of the
it said certification "save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judi-
cial federalism." Others have pointed out that certification is a partial solution to the
problem of ascertaining unclear state law. See Woods, The Erie Enigma: Appellate Review of
Conclusions of Law, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 755, 766-67 (1984)[hereinafter Woods]; Note, State Law
In Federal Courts: The Implications of De Novo Review, 60 WASH. L. REv. 739, 750-55
(1985) [hereinafter Note, The Implications of De Novo Review].
Not all states have certification procedures. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13,
§ 4248 (discussing the growing popularity of certification and listing the states which have
certification statutes). Additionally, some litigants, as in Rawson, will oppose certification,
for whatever reason. Although opposition may not bind the court, it will influence the
decision.
Finally, a subtle but important point is that the process of certification is only about
thirty years old. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 4248. The local judge rule devel-
oped before certification was available. The perceived need for reliance on the local judge
rule may have been more pronounced before difficult questions could be shuttled from
state to federal court and may explain to some extent the eagerness of federal appellate
courts to defer to district court determinations of unclear state law. I am indebted to Mark
Spencer for this observation.
55. See Rawson, 822 F.2d at 911 & nn.5-6.
56. Id. at 911 (quoting Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1384 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1985)). See also McGehee v. Farmers Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1984). The
majority thus invoked the exception to the local judge rule for conflicting opinions from
the lower federal courts. See supra note 22.
57. See Rawson, 822 F.2d at 914-22.
58. Judge McKay said that "the majority proceeds to make its 'own independent in-
quiry into the proper interpretation of state law,' maj. op. at 911-912, unabashedly adopt-
ing a de novo standard of review." Id. at 925 (McKay, J., dissenting). He further stated
that the answer to the legal question "given by the local district judge sitting in Colorado
in this case is not reversible under a disciplined application of the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review." Id. Judge McKay noted that he would happily seek "the en banc aban-
donment of the clearly erroneous standard of review," but emphasized that the panel was
without power to "ignore, rewrite, or reject it." Id. at 925 & n.1.
59. Judge McKay wrote that absent the local judge rule, he was "persuaded that the
district court's extensive and specific analysis of Colorado law with respect to express and
implied statutory rights of action is correct." Id. at 928 (McKay, J., dissenting). Whether
correct or not, the split of authority combined with the district court's persuasive reason-
ing demonstrates at the least that the district court's decision would not have been re-
versed had it been given any deference.
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local judge rule to litigants and appellate practitioners, and suggests
that the rule deserves thoughtful consideration.
60
Ironically, the Tenth Circuit's local rules require practitioners to in-
clude the standard of review in their appellate briefs.6 1 Given the ex-
isting confusion in the Tenth Circuit, articulation of the applicable
standard could be a difficult task. Other circuits have have given clearer
guidance to litigants and appellate practitioners.
C. The Standard in Other Circuits
If the Tenth Circuit can be fairly characterized as both confused
and, in most cases, highly deferential in its application of the rule,62 the
Ninth Circuit has adopted a polar position by comparison. Prior to
1984, the Ninth Circuit, like the Tenth, reviewed unclear determinations
of 'state law under the clearly erroneous or clearly wrong versions of the
rule.63 In In re McLinn,6 4 however, the en banc court distanced itself
from all other circuits by deciding to give full de novo review to determi-
nations of unclear state law.
McLinn was a wrongful death action involving the collision of two
skiffs near Kodiak, Alaska. 6 5 The question was whether a fishing skiff
that was being used temporarily for recreation was "devoted to recrea-
tional pursuit" within the meaning of an Alaska statute which the Alaska
Supreme Court had not yet interpreted. 66 The trial court held that the
statute did not apply. On appeal, the three-judge panel found the stan-
dard of review under the local judge rule dispositive and therefore
unanimously requested en banc review of the issue.
6 7
McLinn is important for two reasons. First, the outcome of the case,
60. For other cases where the rule was dispositive, see infra notes 67 & 137 and ac-
companying text.
61. See 10TH Cm. CT. R. 28.2(c).
62. See supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text. Accurate characterization of the
Tenth Circuit's rule is difficult. If one were forced to pick among the various standards
though, one would probably pick, if for no other reason than sheer citation to authority,
the clearly erroneous rule. See supra note 26.
63. See, e.g., Jablonski By Pauls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 1983);
Fleury v. Harper & Row, 698 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 149
(1983); Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1982).
Prior to 1984, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits stood alone in their application of the dearly
erroneous or dearly wrong standards. See WRIGTrr & MILLER, supra note 13, § 4507, at
108-10 & n.60.
64. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc).
65. The federal court had jurisdiction over the admiralty case under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) (1982) and Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 669 (1982)(holding that
collision of vessels on navigable waters is within federal admiralty jurisdiction). It is inter-
esting to note this application of the local judge rule in a federal question case. See supra
note 14.
66. The statute, ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.040 (1981), made the owners of watercraft
civilly liable for injury or damage caused by the negligent operation of their watercraft.
The plaintiff's claim turned on whether the defendant's skiff was a watercraft within the
meaning of the statute. See In re McLinn, No. A80-038, slip op. at 6-7 (D.C. Alaska Nov. 4,
1982).
67. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397. The panel refused to certify the question, noting that
the plaintiffhad not requested certification in the trial court. "We believe that particularly
compelling reasons must be shown when certification is requested for the first time on
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like the outcome in the Tenth Circuit's Rawson decision, turned on the
application of the local judge rule. If the circuit court afforded defer-
ence to the district court's decision, it would affirm; if the court did not
defer, it would reverse.68 This again highlights the importance of the
local judge rule. Second, in rejecting the dearly erroneous or clearly
wrong standard and deciding to review de novo, the Ninth Circuit be-
came the first circuit to reject the notion that some degree of deference
to the district court is justified.69 In doing so, it created a split between
the circuits.
70
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits now occupy opposite ends of the
spectrum, employing the no deference and extreme deference stan-
dards, respectively. 7 1 And they occupy those extreme positions alone.
The other federal circuit courts all fall in the intermediate category and
give some deference (something more than no deference, but some-
thing less than review under the clearly erroneous standard) to federal
district court determinations of unclear state law. 72 Notably, the Eighth
Circuit, like the Ninth, explicitly addressed the issue and replaced its
"clear error" standard with a "great weight" standard.73
This brief survey provides a sort of landscape of the circuits high-
lighting the truly unique position of the Tenth Circuit in its application
of the local judge rule. The Tenth Circuit now stands alone, giving ex-
treme deference to district court determinations of unclear state law.
appeal by a movant who lost on [the] issue below." Complaint of McLinn, No. 82-3644,
slip op. at 4441-43 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1984).
68. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397.
69. The court's reasoning for rejecting the rule is particularly important and is dis-
cussed throughout Parts II and III in conjunction with the various theoretical justifications
for the rule.
70. Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision there was disagreement among the circuits
regarding the degree of deference to give to determinations of unclear state law. All of the
circuits, however, agreed that the district court's decision was entitled to some deference.
See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
71. See supra notes 26-47 and 64-69 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Shipes v. Hanover Ins., 884 F.2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 1989)(entitled to
deference); Millerv. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523, 531-32 (1st Cir. 1989)(much deference);
Balliache v. Fru-Con Constr. Corp., 866 F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1989)(great deference);
National Bank v. Pearson, 863 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1988)(substantial deference); An-
derson v. Marathon Petroleum, 801 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1986)(some deference); Rudd
Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co. 735 F.2d 974, 978 (6th Cir. 1984)(considerable
weight); Leasing Consultants, Inc. v. Feldman, 592 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1979)(accepting rea-
sonable and careful analysis).
73. See Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 n.6 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). See also Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449,
1451-52 (8th Cir. 1986)(considerable deference). Prior to Luke, the Eighth Circuit had
stated that "where the trial judge arrives at a permissible conclusion with respect to the
law of his state, such conclusion will be binding on appeal." Luke, 476 F.2d at 1019 n.6.
The court abandoned its highly deferential standard in favor of the "great weight" stan-
dard, noting that the rule had been much criticized, that its application precludes appellate
consideration of significant questions, and that other circuits had not bound themselves to
the district court's conclusions of law. Id. The Eighth Circuit did not review the issue en
banc. The confusion in the Tenth Circuit, as well as the Tenth Circuit's rule requiring an
en banc panel to reverse panel authority, calls for an en banc review of the issue. See supra
note 46.
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No other circuit continues to apply a "dearly erroneous" standard. Part
II considers whether the Tenth Circuit is justified in maintaining its
unique position.
II. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE LOCAL JUDGE RULE
The local judge rule alters the normal de novo standard of review
for questions of law. Three primary justifications for the rule have been
advanced: (1) that Erie v. Tompkins74 compels deference to district court
determinations of unclear state law; (2) that district courts have some
special expertise in ascertaining unclear state law; and (3) that the
United States Supreme Court defers to lower court determination of
state law. Part II considers whether departure from the de novo stan-
dard is justifiable under any of these theories.
The analysis begins with a discussion of Erie, not on the ground that
Erie is the most compelling justification for the rule, but because it pro-
vides a logical springboard into questions of ascertaining and following
state law. Notwithstanding recent commentary to the contrary, Erie is
not a justification for, or against, the rule.
Section B considers the primary justification for the rule-that fed-
eral district court judges have expertise in matters of state law which
entities their decisions to deference. This justification, although broadly
accepted, is highly problematic and in the end does not warrant depar-
ture from the de novo standard of review. This part ends with a discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's practice of deferring to lower federal courts
on matters of state law, concluding that this practice does not justify
deference.
A. Erie as a Justification for the Rule
Erie has many faces which, while enormously fascinating, are not
pertinent here. 75 The relevant portion of Erie is its familiar command
that federal courts follow state law whether "declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court .... 76 Including state decisional law
in this command was a departure from previous interpretations of the
Rules of Decision Act.7 7 Two important assumptions are implicit in
Erie. One is that statejudges, not unlike state legislators, have some role
74. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
75. See, e.g., Ely, The Irrepressible Myth Of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1974)(discussing
Erie's implications under the Constitution, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules En-
abling Act).
76. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
77. Erie held that § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1934, which commands federal courts to
follow the "laws of the several states," includes state decisional law. Originally enacted as
§ 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of Decision Act provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). Prior to Erie, federal courts were free to disregard state court
decisional law in following the laws of the several states, although they were bound to
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in making law. 78 The other is Erie's recognition that federal courts can
ascertain state law.
7 9
In the post-Erie world, the problem of ascertaining* state decisional
law presented itself in a series of now infamous 1940 cases. The nadir
was Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field.8 0 A brief discussion of Field is neces-
sary to understand the argument that Erie mandates some form of the
local judge rule.
Prior to 1932, the state of New Jersey had not permitted "Totten
trusts" by which a person could make a deposit in a savings bank for
himself as trustee for another and create a tentative trust, revocable at
any time before death. That changed in 1932 when the NewJersey leg-
islature passed four statutes which, in dearest terms, permitted Totten
trusts.8 1 In 1935, Miss Peck made a deposit in trust for Miss Field. Miss
Peck died thereafter and Miss Field sued the bank, which had denied the
validity of the trust, to collect the funds.
In the meantime, NewJersey's Court of Chancery had been at work.
The 1932 legislation came before the court in 1936 in two unrelated
cases in which "two vice-chancellors had more respect for the law than
to believe it could be made imperfect by a mere legislature, and so they
had construed the statute away by decision."
8 2
follow state constitutions, statutes and decisions construing them. Thompson v. Consoli-
dated Gas Utils., 300 U.S. 55, 74-75 (1937).
As noted earlier, Erie not only applies to diversity cases, but also applies to all cases
where state law controls. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 14, at 858 n.2. See also Kur-
land, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court And The Erie Doctrine In Diversity Cases, 67 YA.E
LJ. 187, 204-05 (1957)[hereinafter Kurland]. This is not a trivial point. Even before Erie,
federal courts struggled to ascertain and follow state law. Any difficulties ushered in by
Erie in following state law were not new in nature; they were only new in kind. See, e.g.,
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933)(in a case involving an indeterminate toll-bridge
franchise, the federal court is required to follow definition of perpetuities as dearly and
unequivocally expressed in dictum of the state supreme court); Portneuf-Marsh Valley Ca-
nal Co. v. Brown, 274 U.S. 630 (1927)(in the absence of decision by the highest court of
the state, independent construction of state statute is made by the federal court).
78. As one commentator has noted:
Implicit in the Erie doctrine is the recognition that courts make "laws." Each time
a court, whether state or federal, speaks it not only affects the rights of the parties
before it, but it also sets down a rule by which prospective litigants might expect
to be governed.
Note, Unclear State Law in the Federal Courts: Appellate Deference or Review?, 48 MINN. L. REv
747, 751 (1964)[hereinafter Note, Appellate Deference or Review]. Erie might be thought of as
a natural extension of the then budding school of legal realism.
Indeed, Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Black and White Taxicab had been written
just years before. Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co., 276
U.S. 518 (1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes wrote, "If there were such a transcen-
dental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until
changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using their independ-
ent judgments as to what it was. But there is no such body of law." Id. at 533-34. See also
Kurland, supra note 77, at 189-90.
79. See Kurland, supra note 77, at 216-17 (the essence of Erie is that a federal judge can
find state law almost as well as a state judge).
80. 311 U.S. 169 (1940). This discussion of the Field case and of the development of
Erie generally tracks the discussion in WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 13, § 4507, at 81-88.
81. Field, 311 U.S. at 175.
82. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: Th Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,
55 YALE LJ. 267, 292 (1946)[hereinafter Clark]: The NewJersey Cotirt of Chancery was a
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The Third Circuit, in Miss Field's case, recognized that the case
before it was indistinguishable from the cases, decided by the two vice-
chancellors. Nevertheless, the court applied the statute, finding the
1932 legislation constitutional and unambiguous, and awarded the
funds to Miss Field.
83
The Supreme Court reversed. The Third Circuit, it said, was bound
to follow the NewJersey Court of Chancery, notwithstanding the legisla-
tion.8 4 "An intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state
law is acting as an organ of the State and its, determination, in the ab-
sence of more convincing evidence of what the state law is, should be
followed by a federal court in deciding a state law question."'8 5 The
Court recognized that the decisions of 'the two vice-chancellors would
not have been binding on the state's highest court.8 6 Miss Field was not
awarded the money Miss Peck wanted to leave her.
8 7
A number of other cases were decided at about the same time, con-
tributing to whatJudge Friendly referred to as the "excesses of [Field] as
to the respect that federal judges must pay to decisions of lower state
courts."8 8 Perhaps the high water mark of these decisions, enunciating
what has become known as the Field doctrine, is a Sixth Circuit case fol-
lowing the unreported decision of an intermediate Ohio court in the
face of a statute providing that "[o]nly such cases as are hereafter re-
ported in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be recog-
nized by and receive the official sanction of any court within the state."'8 9
Not surprisingly, a host of criticism followed these decisions. Judge
Jerome Frank said that federal judges were now "to play the rule [sic] of
the ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state."9 0
Professor Clark said that the Field doctrine is "the most troublesome, the
court of original jurisdiction, though it had statewide jurisdiction and standing in equity
comparable to an intermediate appellate court in law.
83. Field, 311 U.S. at 177.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 177-78.
86. Id. at 179. Professor Corbin notes that the vice-chancellors are judges of a "court
of first instance." All that the Court says about the Vice-Chancellor as a law-making "or-
gan" of the state (Holmes' "quasi-sovereign") can also be said about any other court of
first instance, from a justice of the peace up. In addition, it may be asked whether the
judge is not as much an "organ" of the state when he decides the issues of a case without
writing (or without publishing) an opinion as when his opinion is published. Corbin, The
Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE LJ. 762, 767 & n.10 (1941)[hereinafter Corbin].
87. Ironically, later NewJersey cases followed the decision of'the Third Circuit in Miss
Field's case, upholding Totten trusts under the statutes. Hickey v. Kahl, 19 A.2d 33 (NJ.
Eq. 1941). The court noted that the Third Circuit decision had been "reversed on other
grounds" by the Supreme Court and that NewJersey law is what the Third Circuit thought
it was rather than what the two vice-chancellors had declared it to be. Id. at 38.
88. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Comton Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv.
383, 400 (1964). The other Supreme Court cases were Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); and Six
Companies v.Joint Highway Dist. No. 13,311 U.S. 180 (1940). A good discussion of these
cases may be found in Corbin, supra note 86,, at 766-72. See also Clark, supra note 82, at
292, discussing Field.
89. Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 154 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
866 (1946).
90. Richardson v. C.I.R., 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
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most unsatisfying in its consequences, of all the rules based upon the
Tompkins case." 9 1 Professor Corbin said:
When the rights of a litigant are dependent on the law of a par-
ticular state, the court of the forum must do its best (not its
worst) to determine what that law is. It must use its judicial
brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste pot. Ourjudicial pro-
cess is not mere syllogistic deduction, except at its worst. At its
best, it is the wise and experienced use of many sources in com-
bination-statutes, judicial opinions, treatises, prevailing mo-
res, custom, business practices; it is history and economics and
sociology, and logic, both inductive and deductive. Shall a liti-
gant, by the accident of diversity of citizenship, be deprived of
the advantages of this judicial process? Shall the Supreme
Court, by what superficially appears to be an unselfish and self-
denying ordinance, foreclose the use of such a process by fed-
eral judges? It is in fact a denial ofjustice to those for whom a
court exists.
92
The Field doctrine was too mechanical and led to absurd results, evoking
strong criticism from judges and scholars alike.
As one might expect, the Court's rather extreme position was modi-
fied so that federal judges, in ascertaining the law of the state, were free
to look to all the sources to which state judges looked. The erosion of
the Field doctrine's almost blind adherence to state law began in 1948.
93
By 1956 the Court had recognized that federal district courts should be
sensitive to possible changes in state law.
9 4
In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,95 the Court acknowledged that in-
termediate state appellate decisions, like state trial court decisions, are
91. Clark, supra note 82, at 290.
92. Corbin, supra note 86, at 775.
93. See, e.g., King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153
(1948). In King, the court of appeals had considered but did not follow an unreported
state trial court decision which, while directly on point, would not have been binding on
other trial courts within the state. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of
appeals was 'justified in holding the decision not controlling and in proceeding to make
its own determination of what the Supreme Court of South Carolina would probably rule
in a similar case." Id. at 161.
94. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). In Bernhardt,
the Vermont Supreme Court had held, in a 1910 decision, that arbitration agreements
were unenforceable. Mead v. Owen, 83 Vt. 132, 74 A. 1058 (1910). The Court found the
1910 decision controlling, but specifically noted that "there appears to be no confusion in
the Vermont decisions, no developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the es-
tablished ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont judges on the
question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the judicial rule." Bern-
hardt, 350 U.S. at 205. The Court recognized implicitly that federal courts should be sensi-
tive to changes in state law. For a more full discussion of Bernhardt, see Note, A
Nondeferential Standard For Appellate Review of State Law Decisions By Federal District Courts, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1311, 1319-21 (1985)[hereinafter Note, A Nondeferential Standard].
95. 387 U.S. 456 (1967). Bosch involved disputed federal estate tax assessments. One
issue was the proper regard to be given to state court determinations of certain property
rights. The Court held that "under some conditions, federal authority may not be bound
even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling." Id. at 465. The Court went on to
say that the "State's highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no
decision by that court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law
after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State." Id.
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not definitive pronouncements of state law. Today, federal courts are
free to look not only to state court decisions, but also to relevant deci-
sions by other jurisdictions, restatements of law, decisions by federal
courts interpreting state law, scholarly treatments of law and any other
pertinent authority.9 6
But what does this now familiar post-Erie history have to do with the
local judge rule? And how can Erie and its progeny be thought tojustify
deference to a cistrict court's interpretation of unclear state law? The
argument goes like this: Erie recognized that state judges make law, so
that state court decisions are part of the laws of the several states.9 7 In
the post-Erie world, it soon became clear that a federal judge trying to
ascertain state law, should not be a "ventriloquist's dummy," blindly re-
acting to any twist in state law, but should be free to use his "judicial
brains."9 8 The ascertainment of state law is a creative process and when
a district judge has the difficult and uncertain duty of ascertaining unclear
state law, it is appropriate for the court of appeals to accord his decision
some degree of deference.
Why? Because the ascertainment of unclear state law is a creative
process, as opposed to the Field doctrine's rigid adherence to any state
court pronouncement. As Professor Woods argues, the district court
has not been engaged in some kind of "homocentric three dimensional
process" of legal reasoning in such cases, but rather, has entered into
the "fourth dimension" of legal reasoning, which involves the "relation-
ship of transcendental values such as truth and justice." 9 9 When the
district court is operating in the "fourth dimension" it has "a better pre-
dictive 'feel' for the processes of the state judicial system." 10 0 Thus, it is
argued that when unclear state law is involved, Erie requires deference
96. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 4507, at 94-103. See also Note, The
Ascertainment of State Law, supra note 17, at 553 (in predicting what the highest state court
would rule, federal court should strive to duplicate the judicial method of the state court);
C. WRIGrr, supra note 17, § 58, at 375.
The role of the court is not to choose the rule that it would adopt for itself, if free
to do so, but to choose the rule that it believes the state court, from all that is
known about its methods of reaching decisions, is likely in the future to adopt.
Id.
97. See Note, Appellate Deference or Review, supra note 78, at 751.
98. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
99. See Woods, supra note 54, at 756-59. Woods further states:
When the state common law is clear, the role of the district courts is equally dear
and ministerial. But when the common law is vague, blurred, or nonexistent, the
district courts' role becomes more difficult. Indeed, the decision in regard to
what the state's highest appellate court would do in regard to a matter it has not
,yet considered often involves the exercise of 'fourth dimensional' reasoning.
Id. at 759.
100. Id. If there is room for doubt as to state law, Professor Woods argues:
The analytic nature of the Erie mandate precludes a conclusion of clear error.
One cannot assert the truth or nontruth of the results of such analysis. Rem-
brandt wits not a clearly better painter than Picasso. William 0. Douglas was not
a dearly betterjudge than Felix Frankfurter, and oranges do not taste better than
apples. So too, decisions regarding the unknowable state of state law are 'wrong'
only when it is clear that they are so.
Id. at 760.
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to the decision of the district court. 1 1
Professor Woods is not alone. Others have similarly concluded that
failure to defer to the district court's determinations of unclear state law
"abandons the Erie goal of conformity" and "reduces the ability of the
federal courts to accurately ascertain and apply state law."' 102 These ar-
guments connect post-Erie case law repudiating the Field doctrine to the
idea that the district court has special expertise when ascertaining un-
clear state law.
These are weighty arguments. Erie implicates important federalism
concerns.' 0 s No federal court wants to ignore Erie's command. Are,
however, these assertions justified? Does it follow that a circuit court's
decision (such as McLinn) not to afford deference to a district court's
determination of unclear state law, rejects Erie's goal of conformity to
state law?
Perhaps. The answer depends entirely on whether federal district
courts are in fact in a better position than the courts of appeals to ascer-
tain unclear state law and whether that position justifies deference. If
the federal district courts can discover state law in a way that the courts
of appeals cannot and if this ability justifies deference, then Erie suggests
deference. Indeed, not to defer would seem an abandonment of Erie's
mandate to follow state law. Whether Erie has been abandoned, or ad-
hered to, however, turns entirely on one's assumptions about the district
judge's expertise on matters of unclear state law.
It is only by assuming that district courts are in a superior position
to ascertain state law that Professor Woods and others reach the weighty
conclusion that Erie mandates some form of the local judge rule.'0 4 The
point here is not to dispute the proposition that federal district courts
have some special ability to ascertain unclear state law.' 05 Rather, the
point is simply to demonstrate that asking whether Erie mandates some
form of the local judge rule begs the question. The real question is
101. Id. at 759-60.
102. See Note, The Implications of De Novo Reviw, supra note 54, at 755. It is conceded
that Erie does not explicitly "acknowledge the role of local expertise in federal treatment
of state law because it assumes that federal courts can accurately apply state law without
it." Id. at 744.
Another commentator, also responding to the Ninth Circuit's McLinn decision, stated
that the "deference given to district court interpretations of unresolved state law comple-
ments the Erie doctrine directive of accurately predicting the highest state court's ruling.
The McLinn case represents the first break with the rule of deference and exemplifies an
erosion in federal-state comity." Note, In re McLinn, supra note. 19, at 284.
103. Erie tells federal courts to follow state law and rejects the notion of general federal
common law. Professor Woods correctly notes that there is wide agreement that the Erie
doctrine "is 'one of the modem cornerstones of our federalism.'" Woods, supra note 54,
at 757-58 (quoting Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965)). See also Ely, supra note
75, at 695.
104. Professor Woods, for example, asserts that when district courts ascertain unclear
state law they engage in "fourth dimensional" analysis and have some "predictive feel"
which is apparently beyond the capacity of the court of appeals. Seesupra notes 99-101 and
accompanying text.
105. This issue is analytically distinct and is addressed below. See infra notes 108-145
and accompanying text.
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whether district court judges have special expertise in matters of unclear
state law. Only after that question is answered can one begin making
assertions about what Erie mandates.
It is no surprise then to find that some, contrary to Professor
Woods and those in agreement with him, have suggested thatErie man-
dates de novo review, stating that to afford district courts deference is to
abandon Erie's goal of conformity to state law.10 6 The proponents of de
novo review, however, also rely on assumptions-namely, that the ap-
pellate court, because of its composition, is in an equal or better posi-
tion than the district court to ascertain unclear state law.10 7 If the
underlying assumptions are changed, then Erie's mandate changes with
them.
Stripped of assumptions, Erie is not a justification for or against the
local judge rule. Erie tells federal courts to follow state law but says
nothing about deference to district court.judges. If we agree with Pro-
fessor Woods that district courts have some special expertise in ascer-
taining unclear state law, then like him we may conclude that Erie
mandates deference. But if we decide to the contrary, we cannot say
that Erie mandates deference.
B. The Expertise of Federal District Judges
The real question is whether district court judges possess special
expertise in matters of unclear state law. There is general agreement
among commentators that the answer is yes. The answer is apparently
not supported by anything more than an assumption-that federal dis-
trict court judges are familiar with the law of the state in which they sit
because they have practiced in the state, or because they deal regularly
with issues of state law.1
0 8
One might wonder whether the assumption makes sense. For ex-
106. See Note, Appellate Deference or Review, supra note 78, at 760. The author takes the
position that deference to the district court is not justifiable and that de novo review gives
"full recognition to the Erie mandate that state courts be treated as law-making organs of
the states." Id.
107. "The appellate court is composed of a greater number of [judges] of at least pre-
sumably equal competence in precisely the same field as the district judge. Their collec-
tive opinion as a panel is more likely to reflect 'state law' than the opinion of a single trial
judge." Id. at 759.
108. Professor Wright succinctly stated this view shared by others:
As a general proposition, a federal court judge who sits in a particular state and
has practiced before the courts may be better able to resolve complex questions
about the law of the state than is some other federal judge who has no such per-
sonal acquaintance with the law of the state. For this reason federal appellate
courts have frequently voiced reluctance to substitute their own view of the state
law for that of the federaljudge. As a matter ofjudicial administration, this seems
defensible.
C. Wright, supra note 17, § 58, at 375-76. See also WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2588,
at 752-53; Note, Deference to Federal Circuit Court Interpretations of Unsettled State Law, 1982
Dum LJ. 704, 711 (appellate judges may lack district judges' experience with state law);
Note, Appellate Review of Unclear State Law in the Ninth Circuit After In Re McLinn, 9 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 391, 399-400 (1986)[hereinafter Note, Appellate Review After In Re McLinn]
(federal district judges deal regularly with state law and are more often than not better
acquainted with the law of the state in which they sit).
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ample, suppose the district court judge had served as a United States
Attorney prior to taking the bench. In his first months as a judge, he is
confronted with a question of unclear state law regarding newly estab-
lished water conservancy districts.' 0 9 Although the local judge rule
would apply with full force in such a situation, there is plainly no reason
it should.
The Tenth Circuit explicitly relies on the rationale that federal dis-
trict court judges have special expertise in state law, however, 1 0 and no
attempt is made here to demonstrate empirically that its reliance is mis-
placed. Rather, it is argued that even if one accepts the notion that dis-
trict court judges are familiar with the law of the state in which they sit,
one is not led to the conclusion that deference should be afforded. Two
quite different questions must be asked. Do local judges have expertise?
If so, does it follow that the court of appeals should afford them some
degree of deference?
It must be remembered that the local judge rule only applies when
state law is unclear, that is, when the state supreme court has not explic-
itly ruled on an issue. 1I How, one might ask, can anyone be considered
an expert at ascertaining unclear law? Is it not odd to think that a
judge's previous experience with state law would bring a special level of
expertise to unclear questions? What would that expertise be? Is it the
sort of expertise desired? Why not subject a district court's opinion,
based on such expertise, to full de novo review? The answer to these
questions depend on the kind of unclarity a court faces.
Part of the effort here is to examine the claim that when state law is
unclear, appellate courts are engaged more in speculation than legal
reasoning so that appellate review can add little to the district court
judge's determinations of state law.112 By dissecting the phrase "un-
clear state law," an attempt is made to demonstrate that such claims are
109. Other situations for consideration include, for example, a district court judge
who, prior to taking the bench, had specialized in federal law of some kind and had no
experience with state law at all; or a state judge who is appointed to the Tenth Circuit to
review an inexperienced district judge. See Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d
1416, 1421 (McKay, J., concurring) (Judge McKay argues that the expertise rationale for
the local judge rule is suspect). Judges might also come to the bench following a teaching
career. It cannot be said that these judges have special familiarity with the law of the state
in which they sit. Perhaps the rule should not be applied to such judges. Or perhaps it
should apply only after some period of time on the bench, after the judge has had the
opportunity to become familiar with state law. Id. And might not the district judge also
have special expertise in federal law?
110. See, e.g., Rhody, 771 F.2d at 1419 ("Where there is no authoritative decision of a
state court on an issue under purely local law, great deference must be paid to the view of
a federal judge who is familiar with the local law and practice.").
111. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The phrase not "clearly ruled" upon
yet is used here because there may often be situations in which a state's supreme court has
ruled on closely related issues but has not offered definitive guidance. See infra notes 116-
118 and accompanying text.
112. See Woods, supra note 54, at 759-61 (arguing that when state law is unclear a trial
judge's determinations should not be overturned on appeal unless dearly wrong because
state law is unknowable); Note, Appellate Review After In Re McLinn, supra note 108, at 410-
11 (When state law is unclear "an appellate court is engaged more in speculation than in
legal reasoning as to how it thinks the state's courts eventually will decide the issue.").
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overbroad, that even where state law is unclear, the district judge still is
engaged in legal analysis that is perfectly susceptible to appellate review.
1. Conflicting State Court Opinions
Suppose there are apparently conflicting state court opinions on an
issue, as was the case in Taxpayers For Animas-La Plata v. Animas-La
Plata.'13 The question there was whether a bill passed by the Colorado
legislature violated Colorado's constitutional prohibition of laws "retro-
spective in operation."' 114 The bill "validated" and "recreated" every
water conservancy district organized under Colorado's Water Conser-
vancy Act to undercut the plaintiffs' challenge to the creation of a water
conservancy district. The district court said that the bill did not violate
the Colorado Constitution and dismissed the complaint. The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 15
Before mentioning the local judge rule, the court discussed the vari-
ous state court opinions and the district court judge's interpretation of
those opinions. One Colorado case had rather clearly held that any leg-
islative attempt to prohibit a previously authorized remedy was a per se
confiscation of the plaintiffs' rights in violation of state constitutional
provisions, suggesting that the district court had erred in dismissing the
complaint. 1 6 Relying on more recent opinions, however, the district
court held that the "right" being denied had to be "vested" or "substan-
tial" and reasoned that the right to pursue a legal remedy is not such a
vested right. 1 7 It was after reviewing these cases, some from the Colo-
113. 739 F.2d 1472 (10th Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1472. Colorado's legislature passed the Water Conservancy Act to assist
communities in financing water projects. Id. at 1474. Under the Act, conservancy districts
could be established by petitions signed by landowners. Those opposed to the creation of
a district could seek a general election on the establishment of a district by filing a petition
in opposition. Id. Concerned with adverse environmental impact, the plaintiffs filed such
a petition in state court. The state court judge found the petition insufficient to force an
election. Id.
Displeased with the procedures in state court, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal
court, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). At this point the lawsuit "ballooned
into a matter of great consequence," calling into question the validity of the Act's proce-
dures for establishing conservancy districts. Id. It was at this point that the Colorado
legislature passed the bill which "validated" and "recreated" every conservancy district
created under the Act.
115. Id. at 1475-76. Abstention was apparently not considered. Abstention, like certi-
fication, may in some cases be a way of avoiding unclear issues of state law. Federal courts
may abstain to avoid needless conflict with a state's administration of its affairs. See Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Federal courts may also refrain from deciding
constitutional issues if there are unsettled questions of state law. See Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally WRIGHT & MIL.ER, supra note 13, §§ 4242-
4246. Courts, however, may not abstain simply because state law is difficult to ascertain.
See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). Thus, abstention, while
relevant, does not eliminate the difficulties posed by questions of unclear state law. See
Note, The Implications of De Novo Review, supra note 54, at 750 (noting that abstention is
costly and time-consuming).
116. See Brown v. Challis, 23 Colo. 145, 46 P. 679 (1896). Brown involved a legislative
attempt to prohibit the previously authorized sale of mining activity. Construing the same
state constitutional provision raised in Animas-La Plata, the court ruled that denying the
plaintiffs' remedies was a violation of their rights.
117. The district judge relied on Vail v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 108
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rado Supreme Court, that the Tenth Circuit cited the local judge rule, in
its "entitled to deference" version. 18
Animas-La Plata raises an interesting question: What does it mean to
say that the district court judge has special expertise in construing con-
flicting state court opinions? Surely, it rarely means, and apparently did
not mean in Animas-La Plata, that the judge brings to bear some special
knowledge beyond the scope of those opinions. 119 Relying on the ex-
pertise of the district judge is dubious when state law is considered un-
clear because there are conflicting nondispositive state court opinions.
The court of appeals is in just as good a position, or a better one, to
construe conflicting opinions. Three heads are better than one. 120
2. No State Court Opinions
Sometimes state law is unclear not because there are conflicting
state court opinions, but because there are no state court opinions what-
soever. That was the situation in Fox v. Ford Motor Co. 12 1 In Fox, the
district court held that Wyoming would adopt the crashworthiness or
second collision doctrine. 12 2 One might say that this is a case where the
expertise of the district judge, who had been a member of the Wyoming
bar and a practitioner, should be considered particularly important.' 2
Fox illustrates, however, that deference to the district court is unneces-
sary where no dispositive state court authority exists.
At the time of the decision, there was a split of authority on the
crashworthiness question in other jurisdictions. The majority of those
jurisdictions had adopted the crashworthiness doctrine but a small mi-
nority had not.1 24 It was apparent that the trend was toward adoption of
Colo. 206, 115 P.2d 389 (1941). In that case, the court held that article II, section 11 of
the Colorado Constitution applies solely to statutes which take away or impair vested
rights, but did not specify what it meant by vested. Noting that the term "vested" was
conclusory, the court of appeals stated that the term probably did not include the right to
pursue legal remedies and any rights which attach during the pendency of a lawsuit are not
vested rights. Animas-La Plata, 739 F.2d at 1477 (citing Continental Title Co. v. District
Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1314 (Colo. 1982)).
118. Animas-La Plata, 739 F.2d at 1472-73.
119. The duty to ascertain state law would seem to prevent reliance on the district
court's expertise where, as in Animas-La Plata, there are numerous state appellate opinions
which have some bearing on the issue. Those opinions would serve as the source of gui-
dance to a federal district court judge, and to the court of appeals as well. This is not to
say that district courts are bound by state appellate court opinions. Those opinions, how-
ever, are to be given "proper regard." See supra note 95.
120. The point here is a simple structural one. See, e.g., Note, A Nondeferential Standard,
supra note 94, at 1313-14 (noting not only that courts of appeals have three judges as
opposed to one, but also that they have more time to consider legal issues because they do
not hear evidence).
121. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
122. Wyoming state courts had neither adopted nor rejected the rule. Id. at 781.
123. The court of appeals, again near the end of its analysis, noted that "the trial judge,
having been a member of the Wyoming Bar and a practitioner, is presumed to be in a supe-
rior position to predict from the evidence available whether Wyoming would follow the
majority or minority doctrine on this subject." Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
124. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), represents the
majority view. Noting that accidents are foreseeable in the course of normal automobile
use, the court held that the manufacturer was liable for failing to eliminate unreasonable
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the doctrine 125 and scholars had endorsed it as sound. 126 Moreover,
while Wyoming had not directly considered the issue, it had described
products liability as a dynamic and expanding field and had shown, as
the court said, no tendencies to modify or make exceptions to the gen-
eral rules surrounding liability for negligence. 127
It was against this backdrop that the district court held that Wyo-
ming would recognize the crashworthiness doctrine. This is hardly a
case where special deference seems necessary or desirable. Indeed, the
meaningful review given by the court of appeals in Fox,128 its discussion
of the development of the crashworthiness doctrine in other jurisdic-
tions, and its recognition that scholars had endorsed the doctrine, as-
sured the accuracy of the district court's decision, made in the absence
of dispositive state court authority.
The point here is twofold. First, even in the absence of state court
decisions, a district court judge does not simply intuit state law. He fre-
quently looks to decisions from other jurisdictions, scholarly treatments
of the law, and other pertinent authority. 129 Second, the application of
that authority leads not to some sort of mystical conclusion, but rather
to a reasoned analysis which is subject to precisely the same kind of re-
view that courts of appeals give in cases not. involving issues of unclear
state law.
3. Failure to Articulate an Analysis
Animas-La Plata demonstrates that there is no reason to afford spe-
cial deference to the district court's interpretation of conflicting state
court opinions. Indeed, quite the contrary seems true. 130 Fox demon-
strates that special deference is not warranted where state law is consid-
ered unclear because there are no state court opinions on point. A
district court will often look elsewhere for guidance and review of its
analysis if it is helpful. Together, Animas-La Plata and Fox generally indi-
cate that even where state law is unclear the district court engages in an
risks of foreseeable injury. The minority view was represented by Evans v. General Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). Ford relied on Evans
and a line of cases which followed it. See Fox, 575 F.2d at 780-81. At the time of appeal,
however, Evans had been overruled by Huffv. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1977).
125. The court noted this trend in its opinion. "Acceptance of the crashworthiness
doctrine has increased since Larsen was announced." Fox, 575 F.2d at 781 (citations
omitted).
126. The court cited Professor Prosser and also noted that law reviews had criticized
Evans. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 780-83.
129. Fox is but one example of the Tenth Circuit's reliance on out-of-state authority.
There are many similar cases. See, e.g., Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226,
1228 (10th Cir. 1987)(Kansas courts had not addressed the issue of group libel and the
district court applied the "well settled" law of other jurisdictions); An-Son Corp. v. Hol-
land-America Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 700, 703-04 (10th Cir. 1985)(in construing Oklahoma
statute the court cited law from other jurisdictions as well as scholarly treatises).
130. See supra note 117-120 and accompanying text.
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analytical process, the review of which is both meaningful and
important.
This conclusion would appear to advocate the ascertainment of
state law by a rigid doctrinal analysis of statutes, precedents and the
like-analysis that would leave no room for Professor Woods' "predic-
tive feel"'13 1 or Judge Jerome Frank's "hunch flash of intuition"'13 2 in
the ascertainment of unclear state law. Has this whole debate has boiled
down to an argument against that sort of inarticulate judging?
What of cases unlike Animas-La Plata and Fox, however, which do not
lend themselves to any particular analysis of case law or statutes? What
do district courts do when the law is such that it is difficult or impossible
for the judge to articulate the process of decision? The law still requires
full de novo review.
The Tenth Circuit and others have created an exception to the local
judge rule when the district court fails to articulate the basis for its deci-
sion. In Weiss v. United States, i33 the issue was whether a landowner
owed a duty of reasonable care under Colorado law where artificial con-
ditions (an aerial tramway cable about 150 feet above the ground) not
owned or controlled by a property owner caused injuries to another.
134
The district court said no duty was owed and granted summary judg-
ment for the United States. 135 The Tenth Circuit held that where the
district court fails to cite to authority or "set out its analysis in predicting
how the state's highest court would rule on a novel question of state
law," it will not defer.' 3 6
131. Professor Woods distinguished between "homocentric three dimensional pro-
cess" of legal reasoning and the "fourth dimension," which involves the relationship of
"transcendental values such as truth and justice." See supra notes 98-101 and accompany-
ing text. Professor Woods draws here from Terrel, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of
Legal Reasoning and the Development of Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 288
(1984). Professor Terrel states:
Perhaps we shall never be able to comprehend in full measure that which is by
definition beyond our logical capacities. In other words, it may be inevitable that
the best understanding of the fourth dimension we can achieve-the best picture
of the elusive tesseract ofhypercube of legal reasoning we can make-is one with-
out substantive content. But this conclusion cannot simply be assumed. Instead,
we must ask these fundamental questions: What is the best approximation of
multidimensional reality that we can make in our world? And what effect does the
debate about this approximation have on legal argument?
Id. at 328 (emphasis in original).
132. Professor Woods' point relates to judge Frank's argument against conceptualizing
legal reasoning as discerning answers from clear prior principles. See J. Fwx, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1963).
133. 787 F.2d 518, 525 (10th Cir. 1986).
134. Joseph Weiss was piloting a helicopter on a search and rescue mission when one
of the blades struck an aerial tramway cable, causing the helicopter to crash. One passen-
ger was killed and Weiss was seriously injured. Id. at 520.
135. The suit was filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Weiss alleged that the
United States had failed to depict the aerial cable as an obstruction and that under Colo-
rado law the United States, as owner of the land, was negligent in failing to remove the
cable or to attach warning devices to it. Id. at 520-21. Colorado law applied under 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) because the accident occurred in Colorado. Id. at 524.
136. Id. at 525. The Tenth Circuit is not alone here. See Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc.,
571 F.2d 1277, 1279 n.1 (4th Cir. 1978)(refusing to accord weight to the district court's
oral articulation of the law where the issue was one of great importance).
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There was no question that state law was unclear and therefore the
local judge rule applied.137 Because the district court had not articu-
lated its analysis, however, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the issue de novo.
The court looked to state court decisions, policies and principles in
analogous areas of state law, like Colorado's landlord and tenant law,
and concluded that the United States, on the facts of thecase, owed a
duty to the plaintiffs to protect them from the aerial cables.'
3 8
Weiss fills the gap left by Animas-La Plata and FOx. If the district court
is at a loss when it attempts to ascertain state law and therefore cannot,
or does not, articulate the basis for its decision, the local judge rule will
not be applied. At least the Tenth Circuit does not seem willing to allow
district courts to ground a decision regarding unclear state law on Pro-
fessor Woods' notion of "predictive feel" in the "fourth dimension." If
deference is not desirable in cases like Animas-La Plata and Fox, where
there are conflicting state law opinions or none at all, and if deference is
not allowed in cases like Weiss, where the district court fails to articulate
its analysis, there may be little reason left for deference.
4. Problematic Exceptions to the Local Judge Rule
The preceding arguments have focused on the expertise of the dis-
trictjudge, the most persuasive justification for the local judge rule, and
on various types of unclear state -law which bring the local judge rule
into play. It has been shown that the court of appeals has an important
role even where it is reviewing unclear state law and that district court
decisions should be afforded full de novo review. A number of excep-
tions to the local judge rule are -mentioned here to illustrate various
problems with the rule.
In abandoning its local judge rule in In re McLinn, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that giving great weight to- the district court's decision, apart
from the authorities cited by the district judge, is unsound because it
invites exploration of each judge's experience and "shifts the focus from
the appropriate legal authorities to the biography of the judge."'
3 9
This observation is closely connected to the recognized exception
to the local judge rule where both the district court judge and a member
of the appellate panel have experience with the applicable state law) 40
The district-courtjudge is just as much an expert and'yet no deference is
afforded. The standard of review, which changes from some form of
deference to no deference, is then dependent on the fortuity that one
member of the appellate panel happens to have some experience with
the applicable state law. 14 1
137. Weiss, 787 F.2d at 525. In reversing the district court's interpretation of Colorado
law, the court of appeals noted that it had "not found any Colorado decision which ad-
dresses this precise issue." Id. There is little doubt here, as in Rawson, that application of
the rule would have resulted in affirmance.
138. Id. at 526.
139. In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc).
140. See supra note 20.
141. Who keeps track of biographical data? When appellate panels are not announced
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Consider also the exception where conflicting opinions on state law
have issued from lower federal courts. 142 The local judge rule does not
apply, again leading to awkward and arguably arbitrary results. Why
should the rule not apply here when it clearly applies in the face of con-
flicting state court opinions, which are entitled to as much or more con-
sideration in ascertaining state law?
14 3
This was the majority's reason for not applying the local judge rule
in Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 144 After the district court recognized a
private right of action for age discrimination under Colorado's statute,
the issue came up in a number of other federal courts in Colorado and
those courts split on the issue. 14 5 For this reason, the Tenth Circuit did
not apply the local judge rule, opting instead for a full de novo review of
the issue. The application of this exception and the subsequent de novo
standard of review, however, was fortuitous. If no other district court
had ruled on the issue before the appeal in Rawson had been decided,
the local judge rule would have applied and Rawson's judgment would
not have been reversed.
It is dubious whether district court judges can be considered ex-
perts when state law is unclear. If, in some cases, the judges can be
considered experts, it does not follow that their decisions should be af-
forded deference. They may, as in Animas-La Plata, be interpreting con-
flicting state court opinions. Or they may, as in Fox, be relying on law
from other jurisdictions. In both situations, district courts are engaged
before the briefs are filed (as in the Tenth Circuit), how can lawyers know whether the
local judge rule will apply? How can lawyers know what standard of review to articulate in
the briefs?
It may well be that the same fortuity will be at work, as a matter of practice, even if the
local judge rule is abandoned and no deference is afforded district court decisions. If a
panel knows that a district court judge has special expertise in a field of state law, it may
afford some deference. Alternatively, ifa panel member has special expertise in a particu-
lar field, that member may be assigned the opinion.
142. See supra note 22.
143. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text, discussing the application of the
rule where there are conflicting state court opinions.
One reason that the rule is not applied when lower federal courts have reached con-
flicting results is based on stare decisis. There is little doubt that an opinion of the Tenth
Circuit affirming a district court's interpretation of unclear state law would be regarded as
the circuit's interpretation of state law and would be followed by lower federal courts (and
even lower state courts) absent an indication to the contrary by the state court. See, e.g.,
MOORE, supra note 26, 0.309(2). It would be odd to think that the first of two conflicting
interpretations of state law (both the interpretations of "experts") would end up the law of
the circuit simply because it reached the appellate panel first.
This point raises important questions. If the court of appeals were to affirm one inter-
pretation over another, would that affirmance be a binding pronouncement on state law,
or would it only be a holding that the district court's interpretation was not "dearly erro-
neous" or "clearly wrong?" The Ninth Circuit in McLinn was troubled by these questions
and their implications for circuit precedent. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1402 & n.2.
144. 822 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988).
145. Two courts recognized the private right of action and one court did not. See Raw-
son, 822 F.2d at 911 & nn.5-6. Compare Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 664 F. Supp 1395 (D.
Colo. 1985) and Grandchamp v United Air Lines, Inc., 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. 34,987 (D.
Colo. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1534 (1989) (found a cause of action under the statute) with Taylor v. K-Mart Corp., No.
85-M-2336, slip op. (D. Colo. Jan. 13, 1986) (found no cause of action).
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in legal analysis which should be subject to meaningful review. If there
is nothing for the district court to say because state law is enormously
unclear, the local judge rule is inapplicable. Lastly, the exceptions to
the local judge rule highlight the rule's preoccupation with judicial biog-
raphies and its arbitrary tendencies.
C. Supreme Court Deference
The Supreme Court has recognized the expertise of lower federal
courts in ascertaining state law. The Tenth Circuit has cited this practice
as ajustification for its local judge rule. 14 6 But the Supreme Court does
not defer only to federal district courts; it defers to the courts of appeals
as well. 14 7 While the Court has deferred explicitly to a district judge,
148
its practice of deference is most accurately described as a two-court rule,
recognizing the expertise of both the district courts and the courts of
appeals in matters of state law.149 Because the Supreme Court's rule of
deference is grounded on the expertise of both lower courts, its two-
court rule is not a justification for deference by the court of appeals.' 5 0
Here we come to an oddity. The local judge rule is presumably
justified in the courts of appeals largely on the ground that federal dis-
trict court judges are the experts in state law because they are closer to
and more familiar with the law of the states in which they sit.15 1 Yet
when the Supreme Court defers to determinations of lower federal
146. See, e.g., Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985).
147. See, e.g., Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395 (1988)(the
Court rarely reviews a construction of state law agreed upon by the two lower federal
courts); Brocket v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1985)(Court normally
defers to the construction of a state statute to reflect its belief that district courts and
courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respec-
tive states); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
In Butner, the court of appeals reversed the district court's determination of state law.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it would "decline to review the state law ques-
tion." Id. at 57-58. The Ninth Circuit noted this in In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir.
1984)(en banc), concluding that Supreme Court practice is not to give weight to the dis-
trict court or to the court of appeals, but rather, to deny review of state law questions that
have been fully reviewed by an intermediate court. Id. at 1399. From this, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that implicit in the Supreme Court's practice is the assumption that full and
independent review will be given by the court of appeals. Id.
For an excellent discussion of some older Supreme Court cases look to Kurland, see
supra note 77, at 215-18.
148. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Court deferred to the
judgment of the federal district court on the state law issue and remanded the case to the
district court, not the Second Circuit, for an interpretation of state law. Id. at 204-05.
More recently, in United States v. Kimbell Food, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), the Court
remanded to the district court for a state law determination.
149. See supra note 147. Commentators agree that Supreme Court precedent is best
read to indicate deference not to the federal district court, but to both lower federal
courts. See, e.g., Note, A Nondeferential Standard, supra note 94, at 1319-21; Kurland, supra
note 77, at 216-17 ("Although the Court has indicated that it will ordinarily be guided by
the lower courts' construction of state law, it has usually not distinguished with any care
between the district court and the court of appeals.").
150. If this conclusion seems to have been reached rather cryptically, it is only because
it appears to this author, as it has to previous commentators, that the conclusion is a clear
one. See supra note 149.
151. See supra note 108.
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courts, it does so on the ground that the courts of appeals are also ex-
perts in state law.152 Thus, both the courts of appeals and the district
courts are the designated experts in state law when an issue is before the
Supreme Court for review, but not when the issue is before the courts of
appeals for review.
There is a not too surprising explanation for this apparent enigma.
The special function of the Supreme Court is the construction and appli-
cation of the Constitution and legislation of Congress.' 53 Scholars have
agreed that the real reason for Supreme Court deference lies not with
the expertise of the lower federal courts at all, but rather, with the need
for judicial economy. 54 If this explanation is accepted, the riddle is
solved. The courts of appeals need not be viewed as experts in state law
at all tojustify Supreme Court deference. Deference makes sense on the
separate ground that the Court must attend to weightier matters.
It might be sensible to extend this rationale to the courts of appeals,
to say that courts of appeals, like the Supreme Court, should defer to
save time for more important matters of federal law.155 Indeed, it seems
that this is the most logical explanation for the local judge rule. Nearly all
federal question appeals are decided at the federal appellate level.
Moreover, there is a current crisis in the work load of the federal courts
of appeals. 
1 5 6
152. Brocket v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491,499-500 (1985) (We normally defer to
the construction of a state statute to reflect our belief that district courts and courts of
appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective
states).
153. See Friendly, supra note 88, at 407. See also infra note 154.
154. See Kurland, supra note 77 ("The real reason for the Supreme Court to bow, and it
usually does, to the decisions on state law of the lower federal courts rests not on the
premise of expertness but on one of economy of judicial administration."); WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 13, § 4036 (Supreme Court deference reflects a concern with achieving
an efficient judicial appellate structure); Note, A Nondeferential Standard, supra note 94, at
1322 (the Court's deference to lower courts in state law matters reflects the Court's need
to conserve its judicial resources); Note, Appellate Deference or Review, supra note 78, at 755;
Note, In Re McLinn, supra note 19, at 284 & n.65.
155. It has been argued that all federal courts are experts primarily in federal law. Pro-
fessor Amar contends that the structural superiority of the federal courts in federal ques-
tions cases is supported by the text, history, and structure of article III of the Constitution.
Also supporting the superiority of federal courts in federal question cases is Erie's implica-
tion for federal judicial responsibility: If "Erie says state courts are the unique and definite
expounders of state law, why isn't the most plausible corollary that federal courts are the
unique and definitive expounders of federal law?" Amar, Law Story Book Review, 102 HAtv.
L. REv. 688, 697 (1988). See also Amar, A Neo Federalist View of Article III: Separating The Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985).
156. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 3 at 11 (Professor Wright states that the last "two
decades have seen a sudden and sharp increase in the work load of the courts of appeals
that poses a major crisis injudicial administration."). This crisis is part of what drives the
arguments for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. See generally Bork, Dealing With the
Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 236-37 (1976); Rowe, Abolishing DiversityJurisdic-
tion: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REv. 963, 969 (1979);
Sherman & Isaacman, State Law Belongs in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 57
(1978)(while the application of Erie may appear simple, it has confused the law); FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY CoMMrrTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE § 10
(1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE] ("The most acute problems of
overload are at the appellate rather than the trial level.").
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Why not justify the local judge rule on the ground ofjudicial econ-
omy? Some have argued that such a justification would be an abroga-
tion of the statutory right of appeal. 15 7 It is true that such ajustification
for a less exacting standard of review does not sufficiently address the
natural effect on the parties' statutory right to review.' 58 Another
profound objection, however, is that such a justification makes the rule
and the courts' standard of review into a stopgap of sorts, not indepen-
dently justified, but created by the courts to address the deeper and
more fundamental crisis in their work load. If change is justified it
should come in more direct ways, such as the abolition of diversity juris-
diction. 159 If the courts of appeals have too much work, that is a sepa-
rate problem with its own set of implications and it should be separately
addressed.
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
As this article was on its way to the printer the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Russell v. Salve Regina College,160 to decide whether a
157. FED. R. APP. P. 3 provides: "An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district
court to a court of appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal ...." Additionally, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction from all final decisions of the
district courts ofthe United States. One author states that if"an appellate court reviewing
the case for errors dogmatically refuses to reconsider the rule of law, the parties' day in
court is not meaningful." See Note, Appellate Deference or Review, supra note 78, at 758-59.
158. This is not an issue in the Supreme Court because parties do not have a statutory
right to review in that Court. Unlike the statutory right to appeal to the circuit court, the
Supreme Court, in most cases, reviews decisions by statutory right of certiorari. Review
may be granted to forestall possible emergence of a conflict between lower courts, to de-
termine whether the courts of appeals have decided an issue contrary to Supreme Court
decisions, to reexamine the court's own decisions and to exercise supervisory power over
the lower federal courts. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, at 4035.
The Ninth Circuit, in In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc), was par-
ticularly concerned that affording deference to the district court was an abdication of its
appellate responsibility. See id. at 1398 (there is "no justification for being less thorough,
for abdicating any portion of our appellate responsibility, or for curtailing the parties'
appellate rights simply because the law involved is state law"). The court noted, ironically,
that "if the parties were to proceed in a state court to litigate a state law issue, they would
have the right to an independent de novo review of the trial judge's determination ....
The parties should be entitled to the same appellate consideration in the federal court
system." Id. at 1401.
159. As noted above, see supra note 156, the current crisis in the federal court work load
has fueled arguments for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. The Federal Courts Study
Committee recently recommended to Congress that diversity jurisdiction be limited to
complex multi-state litigation, interpleader and suits involving aliens. See FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMrrrEE, supra note 158, at 38-42. The Committee noted "crisis of volume" in
the courts of appeals and advocated fundamental changes to the appellate courts. Recom-
mendations include quick congressional approval of additional appellate judgeships, sig-
nificant procedural and structural reform of the circuit courts and a pilot project for
dealing with intercircuit conflicts. Id. at 109.
160. 890 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3827 (1990). In Russell, the
First Circuit held that "in view of the customary appellate deference accorded to interpre-
tations of state law" the district court's determination that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court would apply standard contract principles is not reversible error. Id. at 489. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a party is entitled to de novo review,
not merely whether de novo review is the most compelling or desirable standard. The
Court may focus its inquiry, therefore, on the statutory right of appeal. See supra note 157,
one among many important considerations.
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party is entitled to de novo review of questions of unclear state law in
diversity actions. Should the Court answer in-the affirmative, the Tenth
Circuit and others would be compelled to abandon their practice of def-
erence, a welcome result. However, even if the Court decides that full
review is not required, the Tenth Circuit would nevertheless be free to
afford full de novo review.
One thing is certain. Unless the Supreme Court decides that de
novo review is required, the Tenth Circuit must thoughtfully consider its
local judge rule en banc. 16 1 Given the current state of the rule, virtually
any formulation of the standard could be supported by citation to Tenth
Circuit authority. 16 2 Because only an en banc court may reject panel
authority, 163 the various articulations of the rule by different panels,
however inconsistent, are all valid precedents for appellate practition-
ers. As noted throughout, whether the court is reviewing a question de
novo or under some less exacting standard, the standard applied may be
dispositive. 6 4 The current state of the rule leaves both practitioners
and appellate panels at a loss.
A. Full De Novo Review
Assuming the court grants en banc review, it should abandon its
highly deferential standard and give full de novo review to questions of
unclear state law. None of the justifications which have been advanced
for the local judge rule withstand scrutiny. Erie commands only that
state law be.followed. It offers no support for or against the rule. To
read Erie as ajustification for the local judge rule, one must assume that
federal district courts have special expertise in state law which justifies
deference on appeal.' 65
The assumption the Erie justification requires is enormously prob-
lematic. 166 To say that an issue of state law is unclear is not to say that
the district court is left without authority to construe and apply.' 6 7 Any
161. The riost direct precedent for considering this issue appropriate for en banc con-
sideration is the Ninth Circuit's McLinn decision where the panel itself requested en banc
review. Judges Seymour and McKay have stated their willingness to review the issue en
banc. See, e.g., Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 925-26 & n.1 (10th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1989) (McKay, J., dissenting)("I would happily join the
panel in seeking the en banc abandonment of the clearly erroneous standard of review of
state law issues."); Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 256 (10th Cir. 1985) (Seymour,
J., concurring)("Although I do not urge that we adopt a new standard without en banc
consideration, I believe that application of the dearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) is
inappropriate and reflects the confusion over this issue within our own circuit."). Natu-
rally, the Tenth Circuit would be prudent to await a decision by the Supreme Court before
considering this issue en banc.
162. See supra notes 26-47.
163. See supra note 46.
164. See supra notes 58, 67-68 & 137 and accompanying text.
165. Erie can and has been read to require de novo review by assuming that appellate
courts are in a better position to ascertain state law. See supra note 107 and accompanying
text.
166. See supra note 109.
167. Both in cases where state law conflicts and in cases where there is no state law
directly on point, the district court may nevertheless engage in traditional legal analysis
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expertise held by the district court is best expressed in a thoughtfully
reasoned and persuasive opinion which demonstrates, on the basis of
the authorities presented, that it is entitled to respect. 16 8 Moreover, the
Supreme Court's practice of deference, because it is not grounded solely
in the expertise of the district court,1 69 is not a justification for defer-
ence in the court of appeals.
The most logical argument for deference by the court of appeals is
one which cannot be endorsed, namely, that courts of appeals as experts
in declaring federal law, should defer to district courts on matters of
state law to save time, given the current crisis in the appellate work
load. 170 The work load of the courts of appeals is a separate problem
which should be, and is being, separately addressed. A deferential stan-
dard of review is not justifiable simply as a timesaving device.
B. An Alternative Solution
If a majority of the court disagrees with the arguments for full de
novo review (and concludes that some degree of deference is justifiable,
and deference is not prohibited by the statutory right to appeal) which
of the various articulations of the rule should be adopted as an alterna-
tive solution to full de novo review? One thing can be said with confi-
dence: reliance on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a) should be
abandoned. 17 1 As Judge Seymour pointed out in Carter v. City of Salina,
citation to Rule 52(a) as a standard of review for questions of law is just
"plain wrong."' 72 Rule 52(a) applies to questions of fact and makes lit-
tle sense when applied to questions of law.
17
In the same vein, the Tenth Circuit should give up its lone position
of reviewing questions of state law under the dearly wrong standard.
Even if some degree of deference is thought to be justifiable, the dearly
wrong standard goes too far. No other circuit affords such a great de-
which is perfectly susceptible to review on appeal. See supra notes 113-128 and accompany-
ing text.
168. See In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc) (noting that it is
unsound to give deference to the district court apart from authorities presented because
such deference depends on ad hominem factors not part of the record). The Tenth Circuit,
by virtue of its recognized exception to the local judge rule which precludes deference
when the district court has not articulated its analysis, has tacitly endorsed this view. See
supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
170. As mentioned earlier, scholars have generally agreed that the Supreme Court de-
fers to lower federal courts on matters of state law to save time for the construction and
application of the Constitution and legislation of Congress. See supra note 154.
171. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
172. 773 F.2d 251, 256-57 (10th Cir. 1985). Both Judges Seymour and McKay have
indicated they would favor en banc review and would reject the dearly erroneous stan-
dard. See supra note 161. See also Hauser v. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d 876, 881 (10th Cir.
1986) (Seymour, J., concurring).
173. The Supreme Court has stated that a "finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Scholars have rightly criticized the
Tenth Circuit for applying FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) to questions of law. See MooPx, supra note
26, at 3125-29 & n.28.
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gree of deference. 174 The dearly wrong standard does not allow suffi-
cient room for courts of appeals to thoughtfully review questions of
state law.' 75 The standard also has the effect of leaving questions of
state law unsettled.
176
If the court retains its local judge rule, it should be retained in its
intermediate form. The decisions of district courts would receive "sub-
stantial deference," but would nevertheless be subject to meaningful re-
view. 17 This would align the court with a majority of other circuits
while providing for meaningful review of questions of state law.
CONCLUSION
Tenth Circuit decisions articulate conflicting and inconsistent ver-
sions of the local judge rule and can fairly be described as chaotic. The
rule has important consequences for litigants and appellate practitioners
and should be clarified. The court should thoughtfully consider the rule
en banc. It should abandon its extreme practice of reviewing determina-
tions of unclear state law under the clearly erroneous or clearly wrong
standards and should instead afford full de novo review.
174. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
175. In its important opinion in Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973), the Eighth Circuit abandoned its ex-
tremely deferential standard in favor of a great weight standard. It reasoned that under
its old standard, so long as the trial judge arrives at a permissible conclusion, the court of
appeals is bound. Id. at 1019-20 & n.6. That application of the rule, the court noted,
precludes appellate consideration of important questions. Id.
176. As noted earlier, under the clearly wrong standard, the court of appeals decision
theoretically can be viewed only asa decision that the district court was not clearly wrong.
It cannot be viewed as a decision on the merits. See supra note 143. Judge McKay has
stated that extreme applications of the local judge rule, such as the dearly erroneous or
dearly wrong standards,
[N]ot only would undermine the obvious purpose of appeals to a collegial court,
where collective consideration is one of the underlying notions, but would have
the wasteful effect of leaving an issue unsettled when subsequently considered by
parties, lawyers, and other district judges. If, as is true in many cases, either of
two interpretations of state law would be rational, we would be required to affirm
consecutive conflicting interpretations by two judges sitting in the same state, the
untenable effect of which would be to leave the issue of law unsettled until the
state court of appropriate authority finally has an opportunity to rule on the issue.
Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1421 (10th Cir. 1985)(McKay, J.,
concurring).
177. For a discussion of the various articulations of the intermediate standard see supra
notes 7273 and accompanying text.
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